The United States today is navigating its most formidable geopolitical challenge in the region in nearly a century. From the sands of Saudi Arabia and the fragile court of Jordan to the waters of the Persian Gulf, Washington is witnessing the unraveling of a hegemonic architecture that defined global order for eight decades.
The question, however, becomes: how did that happen? How did an unprecedented empire sleepwalk into an unwinnable conflict, lose its military grip on the region, and leave its allies completely vulnerable to daily attacks?
To answer that, one must look at how American power was actually anchored in the region. For decades, American installations spanning the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf served as the primary symbols of Western hegemony. They projected dominance and guaranteed safety for regional allies under a single, shared defensive umbrella. Washington provided integrated early-warning radar systems, advanced air defense systems, and naval protection, and regional host nations in turn supplied the land, logistics, and rights to host American troops.
Yet this structure hid three fatal flaws. To begin with, the entire network functioned like an interconnected spiderweb of bases, where one installation could not operate without the other. As a result, if one central hub fell, the surrounding network collapsed with it. When Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain took direct hits, for example, its impact hit the American armada immediately. That is, because the U.S. naval ships, including aircraft carriers like the Gerald R. Ford, were engineered to rely specifically on that base for pier-side replenishment and heavy fleet maintenance, the cutting of the ability to refuel and rearm made them largely a bathtub target for the Iranian missiles.
In addition, Washington fundamentally misjudged local culture, harsh geography, and the true limits of its relationships with central governments, mistaking regime survival for actual stability on the ground. This mistake proved particularly fatal across Jordan and Saudi Arabia, two tribal nations where central authority receded at the borders and control rested entirely with the tribes.
Angered by what they saw as a broken covenant, the implicit contract where the monarchy guaranteed security and socio-economic stability in exchange for compliance, these tribal networks became a direct strategic threat by acting as the operational eyes and ears for Washington’s adversaries.
In Jordan, for example, driven by long-standing grievances, including the 2021 defense agreement that granted Washington unprecedented military access, local tribes began using their position on the ground to gather real-time intelligence for Iranian missile units. That human tracking on the ground was instrumental in enabling Iranian forces to target U.S. battle management hubs, resulting in the destruction of a $500 million E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft directly on the tarmac.
Finally, Washington fundamentally underestimated Iran’s doctrine of asymmetric warfare and its calculated war of attrition. Based on the concept of unsustainable exhaustion, Tehran unleashed a dual strategy, spanning both air and maritime domains, that would force Western air defense stockpiles into rapid, irrevocable depletion.
In the air domain, Iranian forces prioritized the rapid exhaustion of Western air defense magazines. By launching massive, mass-produced saturation salvos of low-cost attack drones and missiles, Tehran not only forced U.S. batteries to use $3 million Patriot interceptors against $20,000 drones, but systematically burned through Washington’s finite stockpiles of advanced munitions.
On the water, Tehran’s strategy proved equally severe as it exploited the region’s maritime topography. Engineered strictly for deep-blue waters of the ocean and not for the green waters of the Persian Gulf, the American Armada became a perfect target for Iran’s asymmetrical naval doctrine. Squeezed into shallow choke points, U.S. surface combatants found themselves surrounded by an estimated 2,000 coastal anti-ship cruise missiles, including the 300-kilometer-range Abu Mahdi and Khalij Fars systems.
This maritime trap was reinforced beneath the surface, where a fleet of approximately 20 Ghadir-class and Fateh-class midget submarines operated alongside an estimated 3,000 smart and magnetic limpet mines along the coastline. By denying access to safe harbors, this undersea layer prevented the American armada not only from maneuvering to fight, but from pulling pier-side to replenish. Hence, unable to reload their vertical launch systems at sea, the trapped American warships effectively became paralyzed as their finite interceptors ran dry against incoming salvos.
For the United States, the strategic fallout of this dual-domain exhaustion is already materializing across the region’s military ledger. Forced to evacuate exposed assets of bases such as Kuwait’s Al-Salem Air Base, while urgently airlifting Patriot batteries and THAAD interceptors via heavy C-17 transports to restock depleted magazines, the Pentagon has effectively made it clear that the American security umbrella is fundamentally ineffective.
Yet, despite this glaring vulnerability, Washington continues to position itself for a kinetic confrontation. By pushing for a direct military campaign under these severely constrained conditions, the U.S. faces two stark possibilities.
The first approach relies on conventional tactical strike fighters supported by massive aerial refueling assets, a strict operational necessity given the vast geographic distance between Israel and Iran. Reports indicate a sudden surge of 70 to 80 USAF KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46 Pegasus directly onto Israeli airfields like Nevatim, Ovda, and Ramon.
However, this logistical requirement creates several fatal problems. To begin with, refueling lumbering, non-stealthy tankers in mid-air turns the operation into a slow, highly vulnerable target easily intercepted by Iran. In addition, because these packages must route across Jordan and Iraq to bridge the distance, local Arab tribes, who have acted as eyes and ears for Tehran, will broadcast the flight vectors and give away all the tactical surprise.
This immediate loss of tactical surprise creates further operational failure. To effectively degrade subterranean networks, this strategy demands a continuous, non-stop seven-day bombing campaign utilizing heavy assets like B-52s. Yet with American bases significantly damaged, U.S. forces cannot physically generate round-the-clock sorties from overcrowded Israeli tarmacs while absorbing relentless Iranian strikes.
Faced with the collapse of this first path, planners may turn to the alternative option: targeting Pickaxe Mountain with extreme destructive force, including the deployment of a nuclear bunker-buster to fracture the dense granite encasing the deep subterranean facility. However, as with the first approach, this strategy will also encounter failure, but with a far more devastating result.
Beyond inviting severe global condemnation and violating international legal norms, executing such a strike would remove Iran’s remaining threshold restraints. From exposing tens of thousands of American military personnel to retaliatory death to asymmetric responses against critical regional infrastructure, including the destruction of vital Gulf fiber-optic communication cables, the Iranian response would permanently alter the military and economic structure of the region and beyond.
Yet, even with these catastrophic consequences, the measure would still fail to achieve its objective, as it could not guarantee the destruction of a multi-tiered facility buried over 100 meters deep in hard granite.
Today, Washington finds itself trapped in a war that offers no victory, where prolonged presence only deepens its hegemonic erosion. While indirect mediation tracks grind forward in Doha, Tehran maintains absolute military readiness, rendering any attempt to force a military resolution a proven dead end. It is time for Washington to recognize this strategic reality and execute a managed retrenchment before its global posture is permanently dismantled.
I think a major point is the lack of cultural and historical awareness . Going into a region one doesn’t truly understand and truly doesn’t even want to understand is a huge mistake big armies make . Who said - know thy enemy? Well it wasn’t us ! But I have to say that although you are right in your assumptions, you leave out a specific talking point . What now? If and when the U.S. leaves, and they will, what happens to this region? Will it be run via Iran? Does Iran even want this responsibility? Does each country manage on its own? And to whom will they ally? Because this region is super unstable and Israel has the nuke. I’m certainly not saying it’s not good that the U.S. will be gone, but my question again is… now what ? And I’m not sure the answer is China nor do I think China wants this responsibility.
Thank you for continuing to provide your insight on the inter-tribal relationships that sustain the kingdoms of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. My impression is that most Americans who have never lived or worked in Arab nations understand Islamic tribal culture. I was privileged to work in Saudi Arabia for seven years. While that doesn't make me an expert, I have benefited from what I learned in conversations with the Saudi naval officer to whom I reported and with my students who were all Saudi Naval Officers.
Muslims are great proselytizers and because I respected Islam and Arab culture they spent many hours discussing their faith and tribal family structures. I learned the tribal patriarchs meet at least annually to decide all manner of things such as approving marriages which are seen as cementing inter or intra tribal relationships and approving financial support for tribal members since commercial lending is considered usury under Islam and forbidden. So with that tiny bit of knowledge about Saudi Arabia I enjoy reading your articles and appreciate their veracity.